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Schedule control can have both positive – e.g., increased income – but also negative 
outcomes – e.g., increased overtime. Here our core interest is whether there are gender 
discrepancies in these outcomes. Given the different ways in which schedule control can be 
used, and perceived to be used by men and women, their outcomes are also expected to be 
different. This is examined using the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (2003-2011), 
and panel regression models. The results show that schedule control is associated with 
increases in overtime and income – but only for men. Women in full-time positions also 
increase their overtime hours when using schedule control yet they do not receive similar 
financial rewards. The results of this study provide evidence to show that increases in 
schedule control has the potential to traditionalise gender roles by increasing mainly men’s 
working hours, while also adding to the gender pay gap. 
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Increasing numbers of companies and governments are introducing schedule control – 
allowing workers more control over when and how long they work - as a less costly option 
to help working families manage work and family demands compared to, for example, paid 
leaves (Eurofound, 2015). Accordingly, a number of studies examine the outcomes of 
schedule control; schedule control has been shown to have a positive impact on workers’ 
work-life balance (see for a review Michel et al., 2011; Allen, et al., 2013), work 
commitment (Gallie et al., 2012), health (Ala-Mursula et al., 2004) and even income 
(Weeden, 2005; Leslie, 2012). However, it can also have negative outcomes, with increased 
working hours (Burchell et al., 2007; Gambles et al., 2006) and work intensity (Kelliher and 
Anderson, 2010) being among the most problematic.  
However, there remain a number of limitations to existing analyses of schedule control. 
Notably, these studies are mostly gender blind in that there is little scrutiny of how these 
outcomes may vary between men and women. Control over working hours can be used by 
workers for a variety of reasons, i.e., for work-life balance purposes, but also performance 
enhancing purposes (Ortega, 2009). Further, it is used, and expected to be used, by men and 
women for different purposes (Adler, 1993; Brescoll et al., 2013). Thus, and especially in 
light of evidence that work related rewards are shaped by gender (Schieman et al., 2013), 
we can expect that both positive and negative consequences of having schedule control can 
be shaped by gender.  
A second limitation is that most studies analysing schedule control primarily look at 
flexitime – i.e., control over when to start and end your working day and the ability to change 
the number of hours worked per day within certain limits, or do not distinguish flexitime 




they work (e.g., Golden, 2009; Antilla et al., 2005). Flexitime and working-time autonomy, 
however, may have different outcomes because the extent to which time boundaries can be 
maintained between work and other spheres of lives are different for these arrangements 
(Clark, 2000). Third, so far most studies have focused on the US, and not much is known 
about how these relationships play out in the European context.  
This study aims to examine the gendered outcomes of the use of flexitime and working-time 
autonomy, on overtime and income specifically, through the use of panel regression models 
using the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP, 1984-2012). The German case is an 
interesting one given its legacy as an ideal type of the conservative male bread-winner 
model, with large gender inequality in the labour market (Esping-Andersen, 1999; Lewis et 
al., 2008). Moreover, the use of working-time flexibility is rather employer-driven (Chung 
and Tijdens, 2013), demonstrated in German employees’s lower benefit from schedule 
control compared to the Netherlands and Sweden (Lott, 2014). 
 
Gendered outcomes of schedule control 
Defining schedule control 
The concept of schedule control builds on the job demands–control model developed by 
Karasek (1979) but focuses on control over when work is done rather than how it is done 
(Kelly and Moen, 2007). Within this broader definition, flexitime is the control over one’s 
work schedule within certain limits. On the other hand, working-time autonomy entails 
(almost) full control over when and how long one works. 
Schedule control is used for a variety of reasons,  including to increase the family-




goals (Ortega, 2009). This is in contrast to other family-friendly arrangements, such as 
parental leave or childcare service provision, which are inevitably targeted towards parents 
of young children. 
Work-family border theory (Clark, 2000), and flexibility enactment theory (Kossek et al., 
2005) suggest that having control over one’s work schedule can help facilitate integration 
of work and home roles while minimizing the chance of work distracting family life and 
vice-versa (Desrochers and Sargent, 2004; Golden, 2009). Flexibility in the border between 
work and family allows workers to adapt the borders – in this case, the timing of work – 
around the demands of other domains – here, family demands (Clark, 2000), and thus 
schedule control is considered a part of family-friendly policies (Glass, 2004; Weeden, 
2005).  
Schedule control can also be regarded as part of the high performance strategy of companies 
(e.g., Karasek, 1979; Davis and Kalleberg, 2006; Ortega, 2009). High performance 
strategies can be defined as an implementation of a wide range of flexible and innovative 
human resource management practices which aim to increase performance. This is usually 
done through the development of systems that encourage workers to influence the 
organization of work, including providing workers more control or discretion over their 
work, to improve productivity (Appelbaum, 2000; Davis and Kalleberg, 2006). Increased 
control over one’s working hours can increase a firm’s productivity by allowing workers the 
flexibility to work their most productive hours. In addition, providing workers control over 
one’s work can help increase the commitment of the workforce which is essential in 
maintaining a high performance management approach (Ortega, 2009).  
Related to this, increased control over one’s work can be linked to higher status positions in 




senior positions or those with higher statuses and skills levels (Kelly and Kalev, 2006; 
Ortega, 2009; Schieman et al., 2009). Similarly, when requesting access to flexitime, higher 
skilled workers’ requests may be accepted more readily by employers (Brescoll, et al., 2013) 
which may be linked to their perceived potential productivity gain through its use. 
 
Schedule control and overtime hours 
Border theory posits that the work-life balance outcomes of flexibility between work and 
family domains will largely depend on the similarities between the domains, strength of the 
border and the domain the individual identifies with (Clark, 2000). For example, rather than 
flexibility between domains always providing better work-life balance, where a worker 
identifies more closely with either domain a stronger border may better facilitate work-life 
balance. This is particularly important because schedule control is not necessarily provided 
for work-life balance, but also to enhance work performance. Flexible, and especially 
autonomous, work arrangements are often accompanied by indirect measures to increase 
performance and output (Felstead and Jewson, 2000: 110). Thus, employees who are 
officially ‘free’ to work whenever, wherever and however they wish  are often expected to 
work longer and more intensely (Gallie et al., 2012), encouraged by measures such as 
teamwork, performance-related payments and target setting. In other words, to meet targets 
and increase pay, workers may increase rather than decrease their work intensity and 
overtime/working hours when given more control over their working hours and no clear 
working hour boundaries are set (see also, Brannen, 2005; Golden, 2009; Kelliher and 
Anderson, 2010). This would especially be the case for workers in environments where work 





Hypothesis 1a: Schedule control is associated with longer overtime. 
Various studies suggest that with schedule control it is primarily men who work longer and 
more intensely, while women are more likely to increase activities outside the workplace 
(Burchell et al., 2007; Gambles et al., 2006). The different outcomes of schedule control for 
men and women can be explained by the discrepancies between men and women in the 
strength of the work and family domains. For most women, family remains a strong domain 
because women still do, and are expected to take up, the majority of household tasks and 
care work (Cooke, 2011; van der Lippe et al., 2011). When the border between work and 
family becomes flexible through schedule control, women are more likely to (have to) use 
this flexibility to facilitate family demands, especially if community-time structures – e.g., 
school opening times – are not flexible. Men, by contrast, not only identify more often with 
their work than women but also have the opportunity to become ideal workers because of 
the support they receive from their wives in regards to the family domain (Moen and Yu, 
2000: 296; Williams et al., 2013: 212). Thus, the introduction of schedule control risks 
enforcing traditional gender arrangements: women use the flexible measures to reconcile 
duties outside work with work, while men increase their work effort when time boundaries 
are relaxed or missing (see also, Gambles et al., 2006; Moen and Yu, 2000).  
Hypothesis 1b: Schedule control is associated with longer overtime only for men. 
The gendered outcome of schedule control may be especially relevant for women working 
part-time. Women are more likely to work part-time than men, with 4/5ths of all part-time 
workers being women in Germany 2012 (OECD, 2013a). One of the reasons why women 
work part-time is because of the time demands they face outside of work and the importance 
they put on their family roles (Greenhaus et al., 2003). Thus, women working part-time may 




time may signal the lack of commitment required to be seen as ideal workers. As such, 
women working part-time are not expected to increase their efforts in support of 
organizational demands especially if this leads to sacrificing family commitments. When 
working full-time, however, women as well as men might have to comply with the 
expectations of the employer and colleagues and keep up with work demands in order to be 
ideal workers, and may use schedule control in a similar manner as well.  
Hypothesis 1c: Women in full-time positions are equally at risk as men to work more 
overtime hours when they have schedule control.  
 
Schedule control and income 
Schedule control can lead to an increase in income for several reasons. Firstly, as mentioned 
in the previous section, workers with schedule control are likely to increase their overtime 
hours, which can lead to additional income. In this case, the impact of schedule control on 
income will be mediated through overtime.  
Hypothesis 2a: Schedule control is associated with a higher income via longer overtime. 
Based on the ‘happy worker thesis’ (Leslie et al., 2012), workers may also experience 
income gains due to the increase in work effectiveness and productivity (for a review see de 
Menezes and Kelliher, 2011). Workers may increase their work intensity as a part of a gift 
exchange to reciprocate for the control they have received over their work (Kelliher and 
Anderson, 2010), which can increase productivity. Further increase in productivity may be 
seen due to the decrease in stress, sickness, and absenteeism, and better work-life balance 




Hypothesis 2b: Schedule control is associated with a higher income beyond that seen via 
longer overtime. 
The association between schedule control and income depends on the way it is being used 
by the worker and perceived to be used by the employer. Leslie et al. (2012) show that only 
when managers believe that workers work flexibly for productivity purposes, not to meet 
personal commitments, does it lead to career premiums. Due to gendered differences in 
family demands and responsibilities, women may be more likely to use schedule control for 
family-friendly purposes, and may be limited in their possibility to use it for productivity 
purposes, such as increasing work intensity and working hours. Even when women use 
schedule control for productivity purposes they may not be able to reap the benefits as men 
do as employers often hold discriminatory views in the way they perceive schedule control 
will be used by men and women (Brescoll, et al., 2013). Furthermore, gender inequality 
prevails in work-related rewards in that, even in similar positions, women have less power, 
fewer resources and gain fewer rewards than their male counterparts (Loscocco, 1989; 
Acker, 1990). Thus, even when women do increase work intensity or hours through the use 
of schedule control, as we expect full-time women to, they may not be rewarded as much as 
men. Finally, employees may trade-off flexibility in their work in exchange for lower wages, 
since flexibility can lead to financial savings elsewhere, such as commuting costs or 
childcare costs (Weeden, 2005). This exchange may be more prevalent amongst women, 
who may have a stronger pressure to balance work with family life.  
Hypothesis 2c: Schedule control is associated with a higher income mainly for men – even 






Data and Sample 
For this study we use data from Germany. Germany’s legacy is as an ideal type of the 
conservative male bread-winner model with large gender inequality in the labour market 
(Esping-Andersen, 1999; Lewis, et al., 2008). However, recent changes in family policies 
aim to promote (high-skilled) women’s employment (Fleckenstein and Seeleib-Kaiser, 
2011) while also boosting declining fertility rates. These measures include the reform of 
parental leave, with so called “daddy months” and relatively high income replacement rates. 
Still, the joint taxation system discourages women’s full-time employment. As a result, 
gender inequality in the labour market remains relatively high, showing in high part-time 
employment rates for women of 37.8 % in 2012 and a high gender pay gaps of 18.7 % in 
2009 (OECD, 2013a, 2013b).  
The data used are taken from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) 
(http://www.diw.de/soep). The SOEP is a representative panel study of German households 
that started in the Federal Republic of Germany in 1984 (Haisken-DeNew and Frick, 2005). 
In June 1990, following German reunification, the survey was expanded to include the 
territory of the former German Democratic Republic. Currently, over 12,000 households and 
32,000 persons are interviewed every year. The sample for this study contains 20,398 
person-years for men and 19,689 person-years for women. All respondents who were 
employed, and with contracted working hours, at the time of the interviews are included in 
the analysis, though excluding the self-employed and those over 65. Working-time 
arrangements were only observed in the years 2003, 2005, 2007, 2009 and 2011, restricting 
our analysis to these years. The raw sample originally comprises 49,980 person-years with 




missing values for contracted working-time. Only employees with contracted working hours 
were taken into account for two reasons: first, overtime hours can only be identified for 
employees with contracted working hours; second, the meaning of working-time 
arrangements might be different for those employees with contracted working hours 
compared to those without such regulation (The later might work long hours disregarding 




The two outcomes of schedule control in this paper are overtime and income. Overtime is 
measured as the difference between actual working hours per week and contractual working 
hours per week. Income is measured through individual annual pre-tax labour income 
(adjusted for price changes), including all wages and benefits such as overtime pay, bonus 
payments and holiday and Christmas payments. The annual labour income was chosen, over 
hourly wages or monthly income, since a higher productivity or work performance might 
not only be rewarded with promotion (showing in higher hourly wages), but with all sorts 
of extra payments. These might accumulate over the year and might be paid annually.   
 
Schedule control 
The main explanatory variable in this paper is working-time arrangements. In the survey 
respondents were asked “Which of the following working hours arrangements is most 
applicable to your work?” The possible answers are 1 = set by the company with no 




oriented flexibility), 3 = flexitime and 4 = hours entirely determined by employee (working-
time autonomy). Fixed schedules are used as the reference category in the multivariate 
regression models.  
 
Controls 
An increase in income and overtime might be due to employees’ higher workplace position, 
where workplace flexibility is more often available than in lower status positions (Kelly and 
Kaley, 2006). Since the interest of the study is the effect of schedule control on overtime 
and income, independent from the status position, we control for workplace positions. The 
following categorical dummies are used: employee (routine non-manual and routine service-
sales), professional (administrators, officials, managers in industrial establishments, large 
proprietors, higher-grade technicians, and supervisors of non-manual employees), civil 
servant, and manual worker (skilled/semi-skilled manual, farm labour) as the reference 
category. In addition, job authority is often related to work autonomy (Schieman et al., 
2013), thus a control was used to indicate the level of job authority the worker has: no job 
authority, management tasks and extensive leadership. By controlling for these variables, 
we are examining the increase in income and overtime above and beyond that stemming 
from changes in job positions or increase in job authority. Moreover, employees’ often have 
a lower status when not working full-time (Williams et al., 2013). Thus we distinguish 
workers in full-time, part-time, and marginal/irregular part-time employment. Controls for 
whether employees receive bonus payments, overtime pay or holiday and Christmas 
payments are included in the analysis. Overtime pay and bonus payment, such as company 
profit share and performance related pay, might encourage individuals to work more 




labour income. We additional controlled for whether employees have a second job. A second 
job increases the annual labour income as well as employees’ weekly work hours (measures 
for overtime and income include total wages as well as weekly work hours including a 
second job). Since income is highly correlated with education, the educational level – 
distinguished into primary, secondary and tertiary education – was taken into account. 
Employees with job insecurity often work longer hours (White et al., 2003), thus a dummy 
variable which indicates whether employees have a permanent contract was used. 
Furthermore, flexible working arrangements are more common in the public than in the 
private sector (Russell et al., 2009), as such, a control was included for working in the public 
sector. The paper also controls for the sector in which the worker works based on the NACE 
2 digit classification: i.e., retail, health/education, metal, chemical and electronic industries, 
service industries, and lastly insurance and banking sectors. This allows us to account for 
the gender segregation of the labour market, as well as to distinguish between the “Post-
Fordist workplaces” (Van Echtelt et al., 2009), where indirect measures of control are more 
often applied. Household characteristics were also considered. Women’s labour market 
behaviour highly depends on whether they have children (Paull, 2008), hence the number of 
children (no children, one child, two children, and three or more children) was used as a 
control. Since women participate least in the labour market with very young children, two 
dummy variables also controlled for the age of the youngest child in the household (0 to 2 
years and 3 to 4 years). Moreover, the split-taxation system which is offered for married 
couples in Germany often discourages women’s (full-time) employment (Sainsbury, 1999). 
A control for being married was introduced in the models. In order to control for period 
effects, years dummies were used (ref.: 2011). Moreover, individuals who are the main 
breadwinner in the household might invest more time and effort into work. Controls for 




models. Also, age and age-squared were included in the analysis. Finally, changes in 
schedule control can be due to job change. Starting a new job might not only be related to a 
higher salary, but also to overtime, since employees have to become acquainted with the job 
or want to make a good first impression at the workplace. A control for job change is 
included for this reason.  
 
Models 
Employees with schedule control may self-select into jobs where schedule control is 
available; i.e., those employees with schedule control might be strongly ambitious 
individuals who, for this reason, work longer hours, signal more productivity and are paid 
better. Also, employees with other time-invariant personality traits such as 
“conscientiousness, agreeableness, and positive affect” might be those employees who 
primarily receive access to schedule control (Leslie et al., 2012, 1425). The analysis thus 
should account for employees’ selection into jobs with schedule control due to time-
invariant individual characteristics, making hybrid panel regression method appropriate for 
this study. Hybrid panel regression allows for measuring group differences (e.g. employees 
without schedule control compared to employees with) as well as changes in individuals 
over time (individuals change from fixed schedules to schedule control). Group differences 
are measured with between-unit estimates and changes in individuals are measured with 
within-unit estimates (Allison, 2009). The within-unit estimates are identical to estimates 
obtained in a fixed-effects panel regression model. Because within-estimates are the 
deviation from the unit-specific mean, time-invariant characteristics, observed and 
unobserved, are differenced out in the model (Morgan and Winship, 2007). Within-estimates 




uncorrelated with the time-variant error term (Woolridge, 2002). Since the exogeneity 
assumption may often be violated, e.g. if workers with an income increase are more likely 
to get schedule control, the interpretation of within-estimates as causal effects has to be 
treated with caution. Still, within-estimates deal with the major problem of self-selection on 
time-constant unobserved variables such as an individual’s personality traits and, thus, are 
less biased than cross-sectional analyses. It should be noted that the estimation of within-
effects is based only on those individuals for whom a status change has been observed.   
This study hypothesises that an increase of income with schedule control is partially 
mediated through to an increase of overtime hours, and that this mediation is less strong for 
women than men. In order to test this a mediation model is estimated where overtime hours 
is the mediator for schedule control and income. Table 2 shows the results for the relation 
between working-time arrangements and working hours (Hypotheses 1a and 1b). The results 
for the relation between working-time arrangements and income with and without mediator 
are given in Table 3 and 4 (Hypotheses 2a and 2b). The within-estimates (changes in 
individuals) indicate changes from fixed schedule (reference category) to one of the other 
working-time arrangements. Changes from fixed schedules to flexitime or working-time 
autonomy might be related to changing to professional positions, positions with job 
authority, job change or finishing an educational degree. This is taken into account by 




Almost half (45%) of the employees in Germany have fixed working-times (Table 1). 




likely to have schedules flexibilised by the employer (about 23% to 20%). Men, by contrast, 
are slightly more likely to have access to flexitime and working-time autonomy. 11% of 
male employees have working-time autonomy, but only 8% of female employees. Around 
23% of all employees have flexitime, 22% of women and around 24% of men.  
Changes from fixed schedules to other working-time arrangements were observed for almost 
one third of the employees (72% stayed with fixed schedules throughout the observation 
years). 7% (799 observations from 402 men and 397 women) of the employees in the data 
changed from fixed schedules to flexitime, and 4% (435 observations from 210 men and 225 
women) changed to working-time autonomy from fixed schedules within the observation 
period. Thus changes to schedule control seldom occurred, but the number of observations 
is still sufficient for estimating within-variation. The standard deviation for the within-
variation of overtime is 2.88 hours for all employees, 3.15 for men and 2.56 for women. The 
standard deviation for the within-variation of income is 6,759 euros – 7,418 euros for men 
and 6,000 euros for women. 
[TABLE 1 here] 
Gendered costs: Overtime 
Table 2 examines the association of changes in schedule control and the increase of overtime 
hours (changes within individuals) as well as overtime differences between employees with 
and without schedule control (differences between groups). On average, employees with 
working-time autonomy work the longest overtime hours, working almost 4 hours more 
overtime compared to individuals with fixed schedules (Model 1-1, differences between 
groups). When switching from fixed schedules to flexitime, workers work more than half an 
hour more overtime per week and almost one and a half hours more when switching to 




Looking at between-estimates, compared to women, men work significantly longer overtime 
when using working-time autonomy (Model 4-5); men with working-time autonomy work 
more than five hours more overtime than those with fixed schedules, whereas for women 
this difference is two hours (Models 1-2 and 1-3). This gender difference also exists for 
when workers start gaining schedule control. Figure 1 shows the predicted overtime in hours 
for men (left) and women (right), to allow for the comparison between the different working-
time arrangements. Women, on average, work less than half an hour more overtime when 
changing from fixed schedules to flexitime and less than an hour more when changing to 
working-time autonomy. Men changing to flexitime work about an hour more overtime per 
week, and when changing to working-time autonomy work two hours more. The gender 
difference is significant for flexitime and highly significant for working time autonomy 
(Model 4-5). Thus, Hypothesis 1b can be confirmed: men are at higher risk to work overtime 
with schedule control, especially with working-time autonomy. 
[TABLE 2 & FIGURE 1 here] 
We expected that the gender discrepancy in overtime with schedule control would disappear 
if we compared men and women in full-time positions (Model 1-4, 1-5). Since the majority 
of men in the sample work full-time (over 95%), the results do not differ largely from the 
overall sample (Model 1-2). By contrast, 40% of women in the sample have part-time 
positions, thus the results differ greatly between Model 1-3 for all women and Model 1-5 
for only full-time women. Between group estimates show that in full-time positions, women 
also work longer overtime hours with working-time autonomy; more than four additional 
overtime hours compared to those with fixed schedules. The gender-gap in overtime is much 
smaller when comparing only full-time workers although still significantly different (Model 




there is no gender difference in increasing overtime hours at all (Model 4-6). Women in full-
time positions increase their overtime to a similar extent as men when changing from fixed 
schedules to flexitime and to working-time autonomy (Figure 2, right plot) confirming 
Hypothesis 1c. Both full-time working men and women seem to undertake a similar amount 
of additional overtime hours, when given schedule control and time boundaries are relaxed 
or missing. 
[FIGURE 2 here] 
 
Gendered rewards: Income 
Table 3 shows the results for the association between schedule control and labour earnings. 
Employees with flexitime and working-time autonomy earn about 2,800 euros and 6,200 
euros more respectively compared to those with fixed schedules (Model 2-1, differences 
between groups). When taking overtime hours into account, the income gains are slightly 
smaller, about 2,600 euros for flexitime and 4,700 euros for working-time autonomy (Model 
2-2). However, it seems that this schedule flexibility premium is gendered. Men with 
working-time autonomy earn almost 6,700 euros more per year than those with fixed 
schedules when taking overtime into account (Model 2-4, differences between groups). 
Women, by contrast, benefit significantly less by having working-time autonomy, earning 
only around 2,000 euros more compared to those with fixed schedules (Model 2-6, Model 
4-3). The gender gap in the schedule flexibility premium also exists when comparing full-
time employees when using flexitime but women gaining more premium (Model 4-4). Full-
time working men with flexitime earn about 2,000 euros more compared to those with fixed 
schedules, while for women this is higher about 3,700 euros (Model 3-2 and 3-4, between 




This gender differences in the earnings gained through schedule flexibility can also be 
observed in the within individual changes. Having controlled for income increases coming 
from other changes such as job authority, employee incomes increase by about 1,200 euros 
when changing from fixed schedules to working-time autonomy, and when they change to 
flexitime they earn on average 900 euros more (Model 2-1, changes in individuals). When 
taking into account overtime, the pure impact of having schedule control is an increase in 
income of 1,000 and 800 euros for working-time autonomy and flexitime respectively 
(Model 2-2). The results confirm Hypothesis 2b in that, even beyond the influence via 
overtime, schedule control comes with income gains. However, Models 2-3 to 2-6 show 
these financial gains are largely driven by the earnings increase men experience. Men gain 
around 1,200 euros more income when changing from fixed schedules to flexitime, and 
about 2,400 euros more when changing to working-time autonomy (changes in individuals). 
Even when increased overtime is taken into account, the income increase is still high at about 
1,100 euros and 2,100 euros respectively. Women, by contrast, do not gain any significant 
income increases when gaining schedule control, with or without taking overtime into 
account. The assumption may be that this gender inequality in earnings is due to the high 
share of part-time employed women. However, when examining full-time employees 
separately (Table 4) the results do not change. After taking overtime into account, full-time 
employed men earn about 1,000 euros more per year when changing to flexitime and 2,200 
euros more from gaining working-time autonomy (Model 3-2, changes in individuals). 
Meanwhile, for full-time working women, changing to either flexitime or working-time 
autonomy from fixed schedules does not seem to bring income gains, beyond what they gain 
via overtime (Models 3-3 and 3-4). We thus confirm Hypothesis 2b, that there are gender 




autonomy based on the significant interaction terms we find for gender and working-time 
autonomy (Models 4-1 to 4-4).   
[TABLES 3 and 4 here] 
  
Conclusion & Discussion 
The aim of the study was to reveal the gendered outcomes of using schedule control, 
focusing on two work outcomes: overtime and income. We find that the increase in overtime 
is gendered, with men increasing their overtime hours more on average. However, this is 
largely driven by the part-time women in the sample, and full-time women invest as much 
overtime hours as their male counterparts when using schedule control. We also find a 
considerable gender gap in the income gained through schedule control. Both men and 
women gain additional income when using schedule control mediated via overtime hours. 
However, women, even full-time working women, do not reap the direct benefit men do in 
terms of income gains. This gender discrepancy exists even when we take into account the 
sex segregation of the labour market, i.e., sectors and occupations, as well as self-selection 
of time-invariant characteristics in jobs, i.e. an individual’s ambition or work devotion.  
The reason behind this can be several. First of all, men and women may have different 
motivations when using schedule control, which may end with different outcomes as well. 
For women, schedule control may be used to meet their family demands, and may even 
forsake additional income for its access (Weeden, 2005). Additional analyses (Appendix 
Tables A-7, A-8) have shown that mothers increase their overtime hours sometimes to even 
a larger extent than women in general, yet they don’t even receive the same income gains 




even be trading-off overtime hours for the increased control over their work. Men, by 
contrast, may gain schedule control as a part of their promotion or use it as high performance 
strategy, rather than as a mean to combine different life domains, again, leading to additional 
income. However, beyond workers own motivations, this discrepancy may be due to 
employers’ discriminatory perceptions. Thus, even when women use schedule control for 
performance goals and increase their overtime hours and/or work intensity when gaining 
schedule control, their efforts might not be perceived as such by employers who might hold 
traditional gender role ideals (Brescoll et al., 2013). This may also be due to the gendered 
organization, and the gendered way in which work rewards are given. This is in line with 
the study by Wright et al. (1995) and others who showed that discrimination is one crucial 
reason for women’s lack of work-related rewards. We extend this logic to rewards linked to 
schedule control. It is difficult to tease out exactly which of these dynamics are truly at play 
with our data, and research is needed to examine this issue further.  
The present analysis was constrained by other data limitations. First of all, the number of 
employees with working-time autonomy is rather small. Thus, more fine-tuned analyses of 
sub-groups of employees (e.g. receiving bonus payments or any other extra payments) are 
not possible. Adding additional survey years (expected for the 2013 and 2015 waves of 
GSEOP) would contribute to even more reliable estimates. A larger sample may allow the 
varying impact of schedule control not only by gender, but also different life course stages 
– e.g., when children are young, older, or when parents or other family members are in need 
of care. Further, in this paper we have assumed that the increase in income due to the use of 
schedule control will be observable in the same year, and were not able to see any potential 
lagged-effects due to the year-gaps in the data. Future studies should examine potential lags 
in the rise in income due to schedule control. Also, measures of productivity, work intensity 




further analysis on the relation between work behaviour and rewards, and their gender 
discrepancies. Similarly, the measure for job demands was missing and job authority in this 
study is broadly defined, and may not capture all possible promotions at the workplace. 
Further information on job demands and authority will also be useful to include in future 
analyses to test whether schedule control is the driving force of the increase in working hours 
and income, or whether schedule control is only a mere reflection of a job with more 
demands and higher status. Future studies could also look into the multiple changes in and 
out of jobs with schedule control to see whether there may be any additive implications 
throughout one’s life course. Finally, gender-specific work fields and gendered work tasks 
could not be taken into account. Qualitative research is needed to capture the gendered 
nature of organizations in more detail, including employer’s actual perceptions on the nature 
of schedule control.  
In spite of these limitations, the results of this study provide evidence to show that schedule 
control has the potential to traditionalise gender roles by predominantly increasing men’s 
working-time and by adding to the gender pay gap. Thus, when schedule control is 
implemented at the workplace, social partners as well as works councils may need to advise 
workers, and especially men, to the risks of missing time boundaries. Also, it will be 
important to promote policies that allow an equal distribution of financial rewards between 
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Table 1: Women’s and men’s working-time arrangements 
Working-time arrangements All Men Women 
Fixed schedule 45.12 44.06 46.29 
Employer-oriented WT 21.40 20.12 22.76 
Flexitime 23.62 24.62 22.52 
Working-time autonomy 9.87 11.17 8.44 
N 40,087 20,398 19,689 
Note: Column percentages weighted with cross-sectional weight; Pooled sample; Frequencies 
significantly different between women and men according to the Chi-squared test; SOEP 2003, 














Table 2: Hybrid panel regression models with within-estimates (changes in individuals 
and between-estimates (differences between groups) for overtime hours  
      
  





   1-1 1-2 1-3 1-4 1-5 
Changes in 
individuals      
Changing from  





0.871*** 1.223*** 0.530*** 1.203*** 0.614*** 
 (0.09) (0.14) (0.11) (0.15) (0.16) 
flexitime 0.682*** 0.909*** 0.489*** 0.985*** 0.795*** 
 (0.10) (0.15) (0.13) (0.15) (0.18) 
working-time 
autonomy 1.503*** 2.056*** 0.896*** 2.164*** 1.838*** 
 (0.14) (0.20) (0.19) (0.21) (0.33) 
Differences between 
groups      
Individuals with 
fixed schedules and 
those with       
employer-oriented 
WT 1.944*** 2.548*** 1.386*** 2.587*** 1.535*** 
 (0.12) (0.19) (0.14) (0.20) (0.22) 
flexitime 0.377*** 0.686*** 0.333** 0.764*** 0.646*** 
 (0.11) (0.18) (0.13) (0.19) (0.18) 
working-time 
autonomy 3.912*** 5.387*** 2.205*** 5.830*** 4.320*** 
 (0.20) (0.30) (0.25) (0.33) (0.52) 
Constant 0.807 1.311 0.126 0.724 -0.757 
 (0.56) (0.87) (0.67) (0.92) (0.94) 
      
R-squared      
Within 0.0404  0.0451  0.0485  0.0421 0.0546  
Between 0.2470  0.2439   0.2077  0.2394 0.2027 
Overall 0.2117  0.2167  0.1722 0.2152  0.1881 
      
N (Individuals) 40087 20398 19689 19447 10190 
N (groups) 15057 7531 7526 7137 4295 
Note: Linear hybrid panel regression models with robust standard errors in 
parentheses; Dependent variable overtime hours; Models 1d and 1e for full-time 
employees only; Employees excluding self-employed; Results not weighted; *p<0.05, 





Table 3: Hybrid panel regression models with within-estimates (changes in individuals and between-estimates 
(differences between groups) for income  
  General Men Women 
  2-1 2-2 2-3 2-4 2-5 2-6 
Changes in 
individuals       
Changing from  
fixed schedules 
to             
employer-
oriented WT 255.780 140.715 297.216 115.312 212.804 166.707 
 (149.08) (146.67) (225.16) (223.76) (195.11) (190.18) 
flexitime 875.783*** 785.688*** 1246.260*** 1111.066** 503.770 461.269 
 (231.35) (231.31) (354.19) (352.12) (269.75) (272.76) 
working-time 
autonomy 1205.048*** 1006.446** 2363.472*** 2057.754*** -204.287 -282.253 
 (331.81) (334.12) (469.03) (461.79) (451.26) (465.39) 
Increase of 
overtime hours  132.178***  148.695***  86.996** 
  (19.93)  (25.85)  (31.21) 
Differences 
between groups       
Individuals with 
fixed schedules 
and those with        
employer-
oriented WT 739.208** -33.670 1291.401** 243.243 377.052 -45.325 
 (281.45) (289.48) (476.19) (490.49) (290.60) (293.46) 
flexitime 2783.200*** 2639.467*** 2242.821*** 1968.199*** 3591.107*** 3492.665*** 
 (347.57) (344.22) (562.60) (556.35) (383.68) (382.67) 
working-time 
autonomy 6203.573*** 4664.378*** 8908.935*** 6694.202*** 2672.340*** 2019.035*** 
 (599.74) (578.39) (953.78) (946.44) (635.96) (584.73) 
Overtime hours  403.285***  418.427***  306.395*** 
  (41.25)  (53.35)  (62.58) 
Constant -4316.053* -4635.630** -2.308.682 -2.866.369 -13427.064*** 
-
13456.501*** 
 (1725.38) (1710.44) (2726.85) (2696.06) (1791.34) (1784.80) 
       
R-squared       
Within 0.1388   0.1419   0.1120 0.1158  0.2060  0.2073 
Between 0.6407 0.6467  0.6108 0.6176   0.5953  0.5996 
Overall 0.6101  0.6169  0.5752  0.5829   0.5567 0.5622 
       
N (Individuals) 40087 40087 20398 20398 19689 19689 
N (groups) 15057 15057 7531 7531 7526 7526 
Note: Linear hybrid panel regression models with robust standard errors in parentheses; Dependent variable 
income; Employees excluding self-employed; Results not weighted; *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001; SOEP 




Table 4: Hybrid panel regression models with within-estimates (changes in individuals) and between-estimates (differences 
between groups) for income, only full-time employees 
  Men Women 
  3-1 3-2 3-3 3-4 
Changes in individuals     
Changing from  fixed schedules to     
Employer-oriented WT 327.029 159.581 57.757 -12.984 
 (227.54) (225.67) (353.29) (337.91) 
flexitime 1173.845** 1036.612** 362.306 275.754 
 (358.37) (356.37) (416.65) (432.94) 
working-time autonomy 2474.268*** 2171.407*** -19.196 -239.956 
 (489.92) (482.23) (960.79) (1029.25) 
Increase of overtime hours  138.333***  113.104* 
  (24.87)  (55.71) 
Differences between groups     
Individuals with fixed schedules and 
those with      
employer-oriented WT 1360.234** 283.459 115.919 -388.281 
 (504.31) (519.17) (485.48) (475.38) 
flexitime 2280.133*** 1969.007*** 3915.480*** 3703.975*** 
 (581.54) (575.04) (537.13) (536.94) 
working-time autonomy 9827.045*** 7405.843*** 7076.633*** 5709.723*** 
 (1048.80) (1043.95) (1355.42) (1234.15) 
Overtime hours  421.405***  325.435*** 
  (54.99)  (82.56) 
Constant -2.321.030 -2.607.875 -19296.317*** -19087.010*** 
 (2905.25) (2879.02) (2439.88) (2419.29) 
R-squared     
Within 0.0964   0.0998 0.1186 0.1206 
Between 0.5918  0.5988  0.4766 0.4814  
Overall 0.5621  0.5700  0.4292   0.4365 





















N (groups) 7137 7137 4295 4295 
Note: Linear hybrid panel regression models with robust standard errors in parentheses; Dependent variable income;  
Full-time employees only; Employees excluding self-employed; Results not weighted;  






Table 5: Hybrid panel regression models with within-estimates (changes in individuals) 
and for income and overtime (for all and full-time workers) with interaction between 
working time arrangements and female 









  4-1 4-2 4-3 4-4 4-5 4-6 
Changes in 
individuals       
Changing from  
fixed schedules to       
employer oriented 
WT 318.682 349.614 133.519 178.613 1.239*** 1.220*** 
 (227.38) (229.78) (225.84) (227.76) (0.15) (0.15) 
flexitime 1256.055*** 1190.089*** 1120.782** 1052.431** 0.905*** 0.983*** 
 (356.52) (360.73) (354.33) (358.60) (0.15) (0.15) 
working time 
autonomy 2370.476*** 2491.421*** 2059.151*** 2181.617*** 2.083*** 2.197*** 
 (472.18) (493.01) (465.24) (485.70) (0.20) (0.21) 
Increase of 
overtime    149.481*** 138.950***   







17865.343*** -0.717 -1.257 
 (3222.01) (3752.31) (3192.69) (3720.26) (1.10) (1.32) 
employer oriented 
WT*Female -92.681 -274.829 43.110 -178.491 -0.694*** -0.577** 
 (301.03) (428.43) (296.34) (412.82) (0.18) (0.22) 
flexitime*Female -732.395 -785.724 -642.680 -738.855 -0.402* -0.174 
 (447.34) (551.93) (447.46) (563.33) (0.20) (0.23) 
working time 
autonomy*Female -2560.799*** -2426.373* -2332.527*** -2343.953* -1.166*** -0.299 
 (654.41) (1084.01) (660.09) (1147.18) (0.28) (0.39) 













      (41.09) (62.24)     
Differences 
between groups       
employer oriented 
WT*Female -860.787 -1.203.376 -205.328 -578.792 -1.177*** -1.061*** 
 (561.91) (702.46) (576.10) (708.06) (0.24) (0.30) 
flexitime*Female 1.331.363 1.564.766 1512.599* 1675.683* -0.348 -0.103 
 (687.96) (799.29) (681.56) (793.54) (0.22) (0.26) 
working time 
autonomy*Female -6544.627*** -3.227.318 -4903.957*** -2.049.907 -3.271*** -1.536* 
 (1146.43) (1692.79) (1116.53) (1612.48) (0.40) (0.62) 
Increase of 
overtime*Female   -118.584 -114.247   
   (79.72) (94.72)   
Note: Linear hybrid panel regression models with robust standard errors in parentheses; Models 4-1 and 4-2 
dependent variables income without controlling for overtime; Models 4-3 and 4-4 dependent variables income with 
controlling for overtime; Models 4-5 and 4-6 dependent variables overtime; Models 4-2, 4-4 and 4-6 for full-time 
employees only; Employees excluding self-employed; Results not weighted;  *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001; 




Figure 1: Predicted overtime (in hours) with fixed schedules, employer flexibility, flexitime 






Note: Predicted overtime (in hours) based on predictive margins; within-estimates separately for men and 
women (full estimation results in Table 2); SOEP 2003, 2005, 2007, 2009, and 2011. 
 
 
Figure 2: Predicted overtime with fixed schedules, employer flexibility, flexitime and 
working-time autonomy for men and women in full-time positions 
 
Note: Predicted overtime (in hours) based on predictive margins; within-estimates separately for men and 
women in full-time positions (full estimation results in Table 2); SOEP 2003, 2005, 2007, 2009, and 2011. 
